You open social media to see a startling satellite image: a military base on fire. But is it real?

The rise of AI has made it easier than ever to generate fakes. Since the Cold War, images captured from space have served as a method of verification for media, governments, and the public. Now, technology has placed this once seemingly irrefutable source of truth under threat.

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This map shows many of Russia’s field fortifications in (and around) Ukraine as viewed via satellite imagery accessed from ESA’s Sentinel-2 data and commercial providers including Planet Labs, Airbus, and MAXAR. For the full interactive map, click here.

Important notes:

1. This map should not be seen as a complete list of Russia's fortifications.

2. The data does not distinguish between barriers, trenches, or other types of fortifications.

3. Fortifications were only included if they appeared new, in-use or expanded since the full-scale invasion in February of 2022.

4. Not all of these fortifications are currently manned by Russian personnel.

A map of pre-2022 fortifications inside Russian-occupied territory is available here.

Recent updates on Russia’s fortifications in and around occupied Ukraine

March 11 2025: Russian forces’ construction of defenses has continued with new fortifications in Kursk and bolstered protection at key sites like air bases.

November 3 2024: Russian forces continue expanding fortifications across the front line and are also taking steps to bolster defenses at key sites like air bases with protection for aircraft.

September 14 2024: Russian forces’ pace of construction of new defenses has become less rapid in recent weeks. New fortifications are still being built, but not as quickly as they were in the opening stages of Ukraine’s operation in Kursk.

September 2 2024: Russian forces continue bolstering and expanding fortifications in Kursk. New fighting positions and anti-vehicle ditches are regularly visible in satellite imagery of the region.

August 24 2024: Ukraine's operation in Kursk has prompted Russia to rapidly expand fortifications deeper within the region.

August 14 2024: Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk has prompted Russian forces to begin constructing new fortifications deeper within Russian territory.

April 26 2024: Russia has transformed its border with Ukraine over the past few years with multiple lines of fortifications. They continue to add new barriers and trenches to these defensive layers. Closer to the front line, Russian forces also continue building defenses in occupied territory. Existing defenses continue to be reinforced with wood, concrete, metal and other materials.

February 26 2024: Russian forces continue to expand and reinforce existing fortifications across the front line. Many existing trench systems have been bolstered with wood, concrete, or metal structures.

November 8 2023: As summer has become autumn, Russian forces in Ukraine have continued to bolster defenses in occupied territory. Many of these fortifications run along tree lines or intersect highways leading further into occupied Ukraine.

October 1 2023: Russian forces expanded fortifications along the border with northeastern Ukraine in recent months. In Kursk oblast, new trenches were constructed and in Bryansk oblast, new anti-vehicle ditches were dug near villages along the border with Ukraine. In Belgorod oblast, satellite imagery shows new fortifications were also built in recent months.

September 10 2023: As Ukraine pushes south into occupied territory, Russian forces are bolstering defenses constructed in late 2022 and early 2023. Less than 10 kilometers from the front line, Russian forces near Ivana Franka (Zaporizhzhia oblast) built new trenches and barriers near existing defenses. Near Romanivkse (Zaporizhzhia oblast), Russian forces laid new rows of “dragon’s teeth” obstacles between older fortifications. Further east, Russian forces near Krasna Poliana (Donetsk oblast) added to defenses that were constructed in late 2022.

September 1 2023: Russian forces in Ukraine continue to expand defenses near the front line and deep within occupied territory. Examples include the expansion of existing fortifications between Obitochne and Andriivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and northwest of Polohy (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Even in Russia, new fortifications were constructed over the summer along the border with Ukraine. 

August 15 2023: As Ukrainian forces push south into occupied territory, Russia is expanding secondary defensive lines. One such example is visible near Chervonoselivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and another a bit further east (in Donetsk oblast) near the T0518 highway. These positions are less than 30 kilometers from the front line in southern Ukraine.

August 6 2023: Throughout the summer, Russian forces have worked to close gaps in their defensive lines and expand existing fortifications along highways in occupied Ukraine. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russian forces expanded fortifications outside Andriivka. These defenses intersect the T0815 highway which leads further south in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Over the past month, Russian forces also connected existing defensive lines near Kodema in Donetsk oblast (about 15 kilometers southeast of Bakhmut). At the airport in occupied Berdyansk, Russian forces dug new revetments to protect vehicles and equipment.

July 22 2023: Russian forces in Ukraine continue to expand defenses along the front line. Near Lysychansk (Luhansk oblast), Russian forces added new trenches and barriers along roads leading toward the city. In Donetsk oblast, Russian forces built new defenses as Ukraine regained territory near Bakhmut.

July 7 2023: As Ukraine’s counteroffensive continues, Russian forces are building additional layers of defenses in occupied territory. These fortifications near Vilne (Donetsk oblast) are between the front line and the occupied city of Mariupol. In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces are also adding to existing fortifications to fill gaps in their defensive line.

June 22 2023: Over the past month, Russian forces expanded fortifications near Semyhiria (Donetsk oblast). These positions are less than 15 kilometers from the front line in Ukraine. In Luhansk oblast, Russian forces near Kreminna recently dug new trenches and barriers. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russian forces built new defenses outside Andriivka. These positions intersect the T0815 highway which leads further south in Russian-occupied Ukraine.

May 18 2023: New Russian trenches sometimes intersect older ones, as shown by this satellite imagery of Zaitseve (Donetsk oblast). In Russian-controlled Soledar (Donetsk oblast) there are fortifications along the northern end of the city. These positions are less than 20 kilometers from the front line. Even far from the front line, layers of trenches can be seen along roads and supply routes. These defenses in northern Crimea are one example.

April 9 2023: Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia oblast continue to expand defensive lines and add new layers to existing fortifications. For example, these fortifications around Vasylivka grew over the past month. In Crimea, sprawling lines of new trenches are being constructed along roads and waterways. The pace of construction of these positions rapidly increased this year.

March 14 2023: Russian forces have ramped up the construction of fortifications across occupied regions of Ukraine. In Luhansk oblast, Russian forces have dug new trenches outside occupied cities. For example, these defenses outside Lysychansk were built in the past few months. Russian forces in Donetsk oblast have added to fortifications along roads leading to Mariupol and other occupied cities. Russian forces have spent months adding to defensive lines in occupied Ukraine. This animation shows an example of expanding fortifications outside Chystopillia (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Along the roads leading into Crimea, new barriers and trenches have appeared over the last few months.

High resolution images show Russia’s fortifications in occupied Ukraine

Ukraine just pulled off a history-making attack on Russia, and it should be a wake-up call for the United States. Using drones launched from shipping containers on the back of trucks, Ukraine guided explosives into Russian bombers across multiple airfields. These strikes included the assembly of drones by Kyiv’s covert operatives within Russia. The drones, dispersed by apparently unwitting drivers, then rose from their hiding places to strike separate bases across Russia, ranging from hundreds to thousands of kilometers from the front line.

It’s the kind of attack defense experts have been warning about for years. Countries like Iran, China, and North Korea boast about their container-borne attack drones and missiles, and Amazon even holds a patent on a commercial delivery drone system using containers.

Read the full piece in RealClearDefense →

In Ukraine, many of the older defensive lines built during fighting between 2014 and 2022 (by both Russian and Ukrainian forces) are now inside Russian-occupied territory. An interactive map showing many of these sites is available here.

A few important notes on this map of fortifications in eastern Ukraine from 2014-2022:

First, this data reflects fortifications (trenches, barriers, and revetments) that were built before 2022 and are now within territory occupied by Russian forces. This includes several years-old Ukrainian positions. Second, Russian forces have not maintained or expanded most of these positions which dramatically reduces their usefulness when compared to newer defenses. Third, this data is not exhaustive and there may be defenses not reflected on the map.

Nature has overtaken many of the older defensive lines built in eastern Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Some older fortifications might be in better shape, but are still poorly positioned for the current front line. In several instances, new fortifications constructed by Russian forces intersect older defensive lines. In other areas, older fortifications have been expanded and upgraded since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The United States possesses the world’s most advanced military equipment, and quality matters immensely in combat. But quantity gets a say, too. And from ships to shells to soldiers, the U.S. military lacks the personnel and matériel it needs to fight a major war.

America’s armed forces, with a naval fleet roughly half the size it was in 1987 alongside an increasingly smaller and older fleet of combat aircraft, are equipped only for short, sharp, high-intensity conflicts. What happens when a war is longer and more violent? Ukraine’s fight against Russia, Israel’s battles in the Middle East and recent U.S. operations against the Houthis in Yemen offer a preview of the demands of modern war and demonstrate why America requires more than we have now to win a large conflict.

Read the full essay in The New York Times →

Read the full piece in The Washington Post →

America has one of the largest strategic nuclear arsenals in the world—and one of the oldest. The U.S. can deliver nuclear weapons from silos buried deep in the American heartland, submarines plying vast oceans, or bombers conducting global patrols. Nuclear power has underpinned not just America’s security but that of its closest allies for decades. But the U.S. is losing its nuclear edge in ways that profoundly affect Washington’s interests. 

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As Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities have grown, so has the number of decoys at Russian air bases involved in the invasion of Ukraine. Several of these decoys are painted at air bases that were once beyond Kyiv’s reach.

In the summer of 2023, I noticed new activity at Russia’s Yeysk air base. Russia was creating plane-like shapes at the base and these white “canvases” were later painted to resemble Russian fighter jets. Primorsko-Ahktarsk, an air base on the Sea of Azov, got its own decoys as well. Some of these are painted in color while others are less detailed.

The pattern continued across nearby bases. At Krymsk air base, home to Russia’s 3rd Mixed Aviation Regiment, new decoys appeared in late 2023. In Crimea too, at least two were added to Hvardiiske air base. While most have multiple decoys some, such as Kushchyovskaya air base, only have one.

Further north, at Engels-2 and Dyagilevo air bases, new imitations of Russian bombers appeared on the ground. Notably, these bases were previously attacked by Ukrainian drones before these decoys were spotted.

So if these decoys are easy to spot, why did Russia create them? While not very convincing in high resolution imagery, these decoys may aim to mislead Ukrainian one-way attack drones that rely on basic cameras for recognition of aircraft shapes. The decoys could also make it marginally more difficult to determine which air bases are active and the specific location of Russian aircraft at those sites.

Check out more images of Russia’s decoy aircraft below ↓

From American bombs to British and French cruise missiles, Kyiv’s Western partners provide their most potent weapons on the condition that Ukraine only use them within its own borders (including Crimea; the Ukrainian peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014). This restriction is a mistake, and one easily remedied by simply informing Ukraine that it has been lifted. Amid gridlock in Congress and delays in European ammunition production, Kyiv’s Western allies can help Ukraine overnight with this one change in policy.

Read the rest of the piece in The Telegraph →

Last September, Ukraine requested Western tanks from allies to push back against Russia’s invasion. At that time, Russia had not consolidated much of its hold on the territory it had taken. While allies debated whether or not they should send tanks, Russia began to dig in….

Read the full piece in The Washington Post →

The Russian air force has played an active role in the invasion of Ukraine. From geolocated footage to satellite imagery, open source research techniques can offer insight into Russia’s air operations.

First, some background: when a satellite passes over a flying aircraft there is a distinct red, green, and blue signature left behind. This is due to a few factors such as the movement of the aircraft. The image below shows the effect and you can find a more detailed breakdown here.

In addition to this signature, some planes may create contrails that can be followed to find the aircraft itself. These partial flight paths can offer insight into where an aircraft may be based.

Finding aircraft in satellite imagery

Many commercial and military flights broadcast their location for aviation safety. This means that it is possible to use flight tracking websites to find an aircraft’s broadcasted location at a given time and then locate the aircraft within a satellite image.

When an aircraft’s operator is not identifiable through flight tracking sites such as Flightradar24 or ADS-B Exchange, the aircraft’s likely operator can be inferred by its location, flight path, reports from social media, or even geolocated footage from government sources.

Researchers have published algorithms that can automate the detection of aircraft (with varying accuracy). For manually locating aircraft in satellite imagery, it is easiest to search near high-traffic areas like airports or by looking for contrails that can lead to an aircraft.

A single cable being severed would have far less impact on highly connected nations like the United States than it would on smaller countries that rely on a few key points of connection. For example, in 2007, a Vietnamese fisherman reeled in miles of the country’s internet cable, causing partial disruptions in the country’s internet access that lasted more than a month. When a Georgian woman severed a land-based internet cable in 2011, the entire country of Armenia was without internet for hours. For those who live in places relying on a limited number of cables, the effect of an attack could be widespread. Entire businesses may rely on internet connectivity that passes through undersea cables.

Authoritarian governments and rogue actors have kept a close eye on these cables and know exactly where to find their most vulnerable points. China has already developed tools to spy on communications traveling through underwater cables. Out at sea, Russian spy ships and submarines traveling near undersea cables have caught the attention of US officials.

Outside of state actors, terror groups are a threat to undersea cables. Even without the ability to attack them on the ocean floor, the sites where these cables connect to land must be secured. As a 2017 report from UK MP Rishi Sunak warned, cable landing points “often have minimal protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot to destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the credibility of the threat.”

The Nord Stream sabotage was revealing as it shows the problems governments face when responding to these kinds of gray-zone attacks, which cause serious disruptions but fall short of a conventional military strike. Firstly, there is the issue of attribution. Rogue actors denying their hostile behavior is nothing new, but attacks on undersea infrastructure can be even more difficult to attribute than those on land. This task is complicated further by a chaotic information space, where government representatives and internet users are often free to trade baseless theories.

The second issue is fixing a cable once it has been attacked. After finding the site of the damage, workers have to hoist the cable to the surface, fix or replace the broken section, then lower the cable back to the sea floor. This is an expensive operation requiring specialized equipment. Workers must also face weather conditions and potentially hostile actors aiming to disrupt their repairs. In the event of a multi-site attack on several cables, especially one preceding larger military actions, repair operations could be extraordinarily time-consuming.

For world leaders watching the Nord Stream sabotage unfold, the most important lesson should be that of preparation. Instead of simply waiting until undersea attacks on infrastructure happen, countries must plan for these scenarios and broadcast elements of their response ahead of time. This would serve not only as a means to cooperate with other nations on maintaining safe infrastructure but also as a deterrent to rogue actors. Intelligence officials warned of an attack on Nord Stream last summer, but it yielded little in the way of planning or deterrence. To prevent another attack on undersea infrastructure, world leaders must take this threat more seriously.

This piece was originally published in AEIdeas.